FAQ – No-Go Products
- Overview No-Go-* as a Dev Project
- Products No-Go-* anticipated Deliverables
- Products
- Complementary (i.e. on Firewalls, Anti-Virus)
- Features
- Concerns
- What else? … Miscellaneous Questions
- More? … Questions with No Answer Yet …
No-Go-* Products – Anticipated Deliverables
Products
- Q B1: What are the essential components that you want to develop?
- Short A: Facilitating proactive/preventative security technology and educating fellow engineers
Longer A: …
- Short A: Facilitating proactive/preventative security technology and educating fellow engineers
- Q B2: How do you know you can stop malware?
- Short A: Restricted access to CPU for known apps only (via cached, whitelisted hashcodes)
Longer A: …
- Short A: Restricted access to CPU for known apps only (via cached, whitelisted hashcodes)
- Q B3: How do you know you can stop ransomware or data sabotaging?
- Short A: No malware – and rapid recovery features in case of damage
Longer A: …
- Short A: No malware – and rapid recovery features in case of damage
- Q B4: How do you know you can stop spyware?
- Short A: No malware – more transparency over exchanged data
Longer A: …
- Short A: No malware – more transparency over exchanged data
- Q B5: How do you know you can stop backdoors?
- Short A: No malware – better detection of anomalies and deterrence (for rule breakers)
Longer A: …
- Short A: No malware – better detection of anomalies and deterrence (for rule breakers)
- Q B6: Are there limitations to anticipated deliverables?
- Short A: Initially, yes; but they can be fixed when security is solidified
Longer A: …
- Short A: Initially, yes; but they can be fixed when security is solidified
Complementary
- Q B7: What happens to firewalls when No-Go-*™ watchdogs are accepted?
- Short A: Firewalls (i.e., security-conscious routers) remain important
Longer A: …
- Short A: Firewalls (i.e., security-conscious routers) remain important
- Q B8: Are antivirus solutions required when No-Go-*™ solutions are available?
- Short A: Cybersecurity is much more than Anti-Virus – these solutions remain important
Longer A: …
- Short A: Cybersecurity is much more than Anti-Virus – these solutions remain important
- Q B9: Are backups required when data sabotaging is stopped?
- Short A: Not required for security, but hardware failures
Longer A: …
- Short A: Not required for security, but hardware failures
Features
- Q B10: Is No-Go-*™ limiting existing computer or network capabilities?
- Short A: No
Longer A: …
- Short A: No
- Q B11: Why is No-Go-Security™ a proactive, preventative solution?
- Short A: Security threats should not get close to CPUs – redundancy if whitelisting has failed
Longer A: …
- Short A: Security threats should not get close to CPUs – redundancy if whitelisting has failed
- Q B12: Can No-Go-*™ deliver perfect security?
- Short A: No, but near-perfect based on protection, prevention, and auto-detection of failures
Longer A: …
- Short A: No, but near-perfect based on protection, prevention, and auto-detection of failures
- Q B13: What threats can No-Go-Security™ adapt to automatically?
- Short A: Security is based on auto-adapting, closed feedback loops
Longer A: …
- Short A: Security is based on auto-adapting, closed feedback loops
- Q B14: Has No-Go-Security™ blindspots, i.e., does it fail to detect malicious actions?
- Short A: Yes – but we help to detect them (late) and deter from exploiting users with them
Longer A: …
- Short A: Yes – but we help to detect them (late) and deter from exploiting users with them
- Q B15: Could No-Go-Security™ adapt to entirely new threats?
- Short A: Yes, but we should hold our horses
Longer A: …
- Short A: Yes, but we should hold our horses
- Q B16: Can No-Go-Security™ solutions be updated?
- Short A: Yes; and updates cannot be exploited in or for attacks
Longer A: …
- Short A: Yes; and updates cannot be exploited in or for attacks
- Q B17: How fast can No-Go-Security™ adapt to new threats?
- Short A: No-Go is proactive – users are protected from damage; no worries about threats
Longer A: …
- Short A: No-Go is proactive – users are protected from damage; no worries about threats
- Q B18: What if software (already) modifies its own software code?
- Short A: We need a different type of proactive security around self-modifiable software
Longer A: …
- Short A: We need a different type of proactive security around self-modifiable software
- Q B19: Does No-Go-Security™ has single-point-of-failures?
- Short A: chosen architecture is self-adapting, self-healing and fault tolerant
Longer A: …
- Short A: chosen architecture is self-adapting, self-healing and fault tolerant
- Q B20: Why should we use RISC, not CISC, for security?
- Q B21: Is No-Go-Security™ incompatible with any hardware?
- Q B22: Is No-Go-Security™ incompatible with any software?
- Short A: No; but some software should/must be adapted to No-Go-Security™
Longer A: …
- Short A: No; but some software should/must be adapted to No-Go-Security™
- Q B23: Why do you require Software Developers/Manufacturers to register?
- Short A: Software is critical; other sectors (medical, financial) already have self-regulation
Longer A: …
- Short A: Software is critical; other sectors (medical, financial) already have self-regulation
- Q B24: Are you expecting too much (info) from Software Developers/Manufacturers?
- Short A: No. We offer developers/manufacturers to improve their reputation easily.
Longer A: …
- Short A: No. We offer developers/manufacturers to improve their reputation easily.
- Q B25: What happens to non-registered Software, Developers, or Manufacturers?
- Short A: This is made transparent to users; they can decide.
Longer A: …
- Short A: This is made transparent to users; they can decide.
- Q B26: Do you expect Web-resource operators are participating voluntarily?
- Short A: No, not all – hopefully enough; but businesses will likely see an advantage.
Longer A: …
- Short A: No, not all – hopefully enough; but businesses will likely see an advantage.
- Q B27: How do you check content in encrypted messages?
- Short A: We create an accepted man in the middle instance in local Network Watchdog
Longer A: …
- Short A: We create an accepted man in the middle instance in local Network Watchdog
- Q B28: How will No-Go deal with filesystem/stateful info managed in RAM?
- Short A: Watchdogs are transparent to all CPU/OS operations
Longer A: …
- Short A: Watchdogs are transparent to all CPU/OS operations
- Q B29: Do you check attack patterns fine-grained or coarse-grained?
- Short A: Both, when we know attack method: fine-grained; unknown methods coarse-grained
Longer A: …
- Short A: Both, when we know attack method: fine-grained; unknown methods coarse-grained
Concerns
- Q B30: Will No-Go-Security™ slow down protected devices?
- Short A: Probably not that much. But security always has some impact
Longer A: …
- Short A: Probably not that much. But security always has some impact
- Q B31: Do we need No-Go-Security™ on all machines?
- Short A: No. Cyberwar can be stopped with a smaller footprint; with ASI, it’s difficult
Longer A: …
- Short A: No. Cyberwar can be stopped with a smaller footprint; with ASI, it’s difficult
- Q B32: Do you use or facilitate surveillance?
- Short A: Not for security; but we must support court-ordered warrants for limited surveillance
Longer A: ...
- Short A: Not for security; but we must support court-ordered warrants for limited surveillance
- Q B33: Are there some goals that you are doubtful about achieving?
- Short A: … well, no device-left-behind promise is a challenge
Longer A: …
- Short A: … well, no device-left-behind promise is a challenge
- Q B34: How certain are you to deliver on your full promises?
- Short A: Very certain on developing capabilities; cautiously optimistic on a broad deployment
Longer A: …
- Short A: Very certain on developing capabilities; cautiously optimistic on a broad deployment
- Q B35: Could No-Go-*™’s development effort be done in vain?
- Short A: Unlikely, if we believe we can deliver on promises; if not, there are still useful outcomes
Longer A: …
- Short A: Unlikely, if we believe we can deliver on promises; if not, there are still useful outcomes
- Q B37: Could No-Go-*™ educate attackers?
- Short A: Yes, that is a valid concern, but it applies to every technology
Longer A: …
- Short A: Yes, that is a valid concern, but it applies to every technology
- Q B36: How much should regular users care about No-Go-Security™?
- Short A: Users should not worry about basic security; more: being protected against cybercrime
Longer A: …
- Short A: Users should not worry about basic security; more: being protected against cybercrime
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