No Go * (Star)

FAQ – No-Go Products


  • Q B1: What are the essential components that you want to develop?
    • Short A: Facilitating proactive/preventative security technology and educating fellow engineers
      Longer A: …
  • Q B2: How do you know you can stop malware?
    • Short A: Restricted access to CPU for known apps only (via cached, whitelisted hashcodes)
      Longer A: …
  • Q B3: How do you know you can stop ransomware or data sabotaging?
    • Short A: No malware – and rapid recovery features in case of damage
      Longer A: …
  • Q B4: How do you know you can stop spyware?
    • Short A: No malware – more transparency over exchanged data
      Longer A: …
  • Q B5: How do you know you can stop backdoors?
    • Short A: No malware – better detection of anomalies and deterrence (for rule breakers)
      Longer A: …
  • Q B6: Are there limitations to anticipated deliverables?
    • Short A: Initially, yes; but they can be fixed when security is solidified
      Longer A: …


  • Q B7: What happens to firewalls when No-Go-* watchdogs are accepted?
    • Short A: Firewalls (i.e., security-conscious routers) remain important
      Longer A: …
  • Q B8: Are antivirus solutions required when No-Go-* solutions are available?
    • Short A: Cybersecurity is much more than Anti-Virus – these solutions remain important
      Longer A: …
  • Q B9: Are backups required when data sabotaging is stopped?
    • Short A: Not required for security, but hardware failures
      Longer A: …


  • Q B10: Is No-Go-*™ limiting existing computer or network capabilities?
  • Q B11: Why is No-Go-Securitya proactive, preventative solution?
    • Short A: Security threats should not get close to CPUs – redundancy if whitelisting has failed
      Longer A: …
  • Q B12: Can No-Go-* deliver perfect security?
    • Short A: No, but near-perfect based on protection, prevention, and auto-detection of failures
      Longer A: …
  • Q B13: What threats can No-Go-Security adapt to automatically?
    • Short A: Security is based on auto-adapting, closed feedback loops
      Longer A: …
  • Q B14: Has No-Go-Security blindspots, i.e., does it fail to detect malicious actions?
    • Short A: Yes – but we help to detect them (late) and deter from exploiting users with them
      Longer A: …
  • Q B15: Could No-Go-Security adapt to entirely new threats?
  • Q B16: Can No-Go-Security solutions be updated?
    • Short A: Yes; and updates cannot be exploited in or for attacks
      Longer A: …
  • Q B17: How fast can No-Go-Security adapt to new threats?
    • Short A: No-Go is proactive – users are protected from damage; no worries about threats
      Longer A: …
  • Q B18: What if software (already) modifies its own software code?
    • Short A: We need a different type of proactive security around self-modifiable software
      Longer A: …
  • Q B19: Does No-Go-Security has single-point-of-failures?
    • Short A: chosen architecture is self-adapting, self-healing and fault tolerant
      Longer A: …
  • Q B20: Why should we use RISC, not CISC, for security?
    • Short A: We must be able to detect malware in hardware
      Longer A: …
  • Q B21: Is No-Go-Security™ incompatible with any hardware?
    • Short A: No-Go-* has a no-device-left-behind policy; problems are too early to predict
      Longer A: …
  • Q B22: Is No-Go-Security™ incompatible with any software?
    • Short A: No; but some software should/must be adapted to No-Go-Security™
      Longer A: …
  • Q B23: Why do you require Software Developers/Manufacturers to register?
    • Short A: Software is critical; other sectors (medical, financial) already have self-regulation
      Longer A: …
  • Q B24: Are you expecting too much (info) from Software Developers/Manufacturers?
    • Short A: No. We offer developers/manufacturers to improve their reputation easily.
      Longer A: …
  • Q B25: What happens to non-registered Software, Developers, or Manufacturers?
    • Short A: This is made transparent to users; they can decide.
      Longer A: …
  • Q B26: Do you expect Web-resource operators are participating voluntarily?
    • Short A: No, not all – hopefully enough; but businesses will likely see an advantage.
      Longer A: …
  • Q B27: How do you check content in encrypted messages?
    • Short A: We create an accepted man in the middle instance in local Network Watchdog
      Longer A: …
  • Q B28: How will No-Go deal with filesystem/stateful info managed in RAM?
    • Short A: Watchdogs are transparent to all CPU/OS operations
      Longer A: …
  • Q B29: Do you check attack patterns fine-grained or coarse-grained?
    • Short A: Both, when we know attack method: fine-grained; unknown methods coarse-grained
      Longer A: …


  • Q B30: Will No-Go-Security slow down protected devices?
    • Short A: Probably not that much. But security always has some impact
      Longer A: …
  • Q B31: Do we need No-Go-Security on all machines?
    • Short A: No. Cyberwar can be stopped with a smaller footprint; with ASI, it’s difficult
      Longer A: …
  • Q B32: Do you use or facilitate surveillance?
    • Short A: Not for security; but we must support court-ordered warrants for limited surveillance
      Longer A: ...
  • Q B33: Are there some goals that you are doubtful about achieving?
    • Short A: … well, no device-left-behind promise is a challenge
      Longer A: …
  • Q B34: How certain are you to deliver on your full promises?
    • Short A: Very certain on developing capabilities; cautiously optimistic on a broad deployment
      Longer A: …
  • Q B35: Could No-Go-*’s development effort be done in vain?
    • Short A: Unlikely, if we believe we can deliver on promises; if not, there are still useful outcomes
      Longer A: …
  • Q B37: Could No-Go-* educate attackers?
    • Short A: Yes, that is a valid concern, but it applies to every technology
      Longer A: …
  • Q B36: How much should regular users care about No-Go-Security?
    • Short A: Users should not worry about basic security; more: being protected against cybercrime
      Longer A: …


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